aaaaaand once again, the Israeli -slashy slash the American who put these clips and commentary together's-position. Anyway, the issue for sure is not dead; worth a reminder-



I've been researching about the mindset of Ben-Gurion during the few decades before the creation of the state. In the early days, of course peace for all was the goal, and it seemed possible. Restraint and dialogue was the policy. When Hitler was rising in Europe, and the Arabs in Palestine were rioting, Ben-Gurion made a major shift in Zionist policy. Then it became clear to him that inherent to making peace with the Arabs was to heed their demands, halt immigration, forgo the idea of a Jewish majority and a Jewish state. In his mind, this was equivalent to giving up on the Jews suffering in Europe. The policy could no longer be peace before everything else. Above all, people were no longer responsive to talk-if Britain's reaction to Hitler and the Arab demonstrations told him anything, its that action moves people, people respond to strength. Yes, he understood Arab grievances, but at this point (late 1930's), Zionism could no longer afford to be a movement of absolute morality, but of relative morality. To him, the suffering of the European Jews by far outweighed Arab suffering, and the Jews had to be saved at whatever cost. From that point on, Ben-Gurion's logic was to create a Jewish national home--not only a safe-haven for the Jews, but a strong Jewish majority presence in Palestine which could not be denied--not by the Arabs, and not by the British--and when this was the case, the Arabs, in their own self interest, will be more willing to create peace with the strong power instead of working to prevent it from existing (how'd that work out?)


Ben-Gurion, with his policy of action, might, and relative morality, lead the Yishuv into wars which put Israel on the map, and laid a basis for a new Israeli identity.

I'm not sure much has changed today in Israeli policy. Of course Israel wants peace, everyone wants peace. But when Peres says "peace" I interpret that as "relative peace." Is Israel willing to work toward peace with the Palestinians before their own peace is achieved? Is it really ready to talk to Hamas (skerrrrt! ok, ok, if you don't like that, I'll say "Palestinians" instead, but Hamas exists as a powerful representative force, and if they are willing to talk, Israel needs to make a serious choice, and it has that choice) in order to come to some sort of agreement, listening to its grievances and make efforts to address them?

Peres says that it was a war of no choice, that the choice was peace and Israel is for peace. Maybe Israel needs to reevaluate what peace means to them, what it might mean for the Palestinian people, and how a new, broader and mutual idea of peace might be implemented--and how it might open up other options to deal with the roots of violence (or "disturbances" as they once were referred to) before violence boils over. If people on both sides are stuck on their own terms of relative peace, then are they limiting themselves to the decisions they argue are, in a way, out of their hands?

I don't like picking on Israel. And I don't mean to here. If one should get anything out of speeches like this one it is the passion, the care, the commitment the man has for his people, and the belief that the best choices were made under the toughest conditions. If Israel saw another way that would work out to their benefit, I like to believe that they would take that route. But they do not see another way-- and neither do the Palestinians. This is where people need to pick up the pieces again... the shattered optimism and open mindedness from Oslo, and start reaching out for a new kind of peace.